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Summary
The study examined the impact of institutional shareholdings on systematic
risk of individual common stocks. The level of systematic risk was measured by
36-month or 60-month "moving betas" for the sample stocks, and the proportion of
systematic risk was measured by the R from the market model regressions used to
estimate the betas. Using a series of regression models, there was evidence that
increased institutional holdings significantly increased both the level and
proportion of systematic risk of individual securities.

INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS AND SECURITY BETAS
Kenneth J. Carey*
Introduction
The increasing influence of institutional investors, especially
noticeable in the last 15 years, has generated several issues of con-
cern to both regulatory agencies and empirical researchers. Several
authors have discussed various economic and moral issues posed by the
increased importance of institutional traders in the equity markets in
recent years [9, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27]. Most authors seem to
feel that the growth of institutions is beneficial, though "market
folklore" still seems to cling to the idea that institutional trading
activity may be destabilizing, if not in the aggregate, then at the
individual security level [16],
The evidence to date [9, 19, 20, 23] would seem to indicate no
support for the folklore regarding the destabilizing influence of in-
stitutional holdings or trading activity JjJ. the aggregate . In an
earlier unpublished paper [8], the author found evidence that institu-
tional holdings and changes in holdings were not destabilizing in
terms of the effects of holdings and changes in holdings on individual
stock price variability , indicating a result in conflict with existing
"folklore." However, there is some question whether systematic risk
might not be increased with increased insitutional activity. Even if
the level of systematic risk is not higher for "institutional favorites,"
*A11 footnotes appear at the end.
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one might argue for a higher proportion of systematic risk for this
group, or for more rapid changes in beta as market conditions change
for those stocks held in higher properties by institutions. These
questions do not appear to have been directly addressed in the liter-
ature.
Several studies have investigated beta stationarity, for indi-
vidual securities and/or portfolios over fixed time intervals [1, 2,
6, 7, 11, 12, lA, 18, 26, 28], as well as by market-based holding
periods [13]. In addition, a multitude of studies have looked at the
relation between internal and external risk measures for firms [3, 4,
10, 11, 21, 25], finding clear evidence that certain accounting-based
risk variables tend to provide good explanations of market-based risk
measures, especially of the beta coefficient.
The next section constitutes a brief review of literature related
to the institutional holdings—stock price variability issue. The
multitude of studies related to beta stationarity and accounting-based
risk measures are not discussed in the interest of space considerations,
Following this brief literature review are sections devoted to the
hypotheses of the current study, the institutional holding variables
employed, the data used, the regression tests employed, and the results
of the study.
Related Literature
Soldofsky and Boe [23] examine detailed SEC data on 1969 stock-
holdings for bank trust departments and regulated investment companies,
finding evld.ence of concentration of holdings in a few stocks. There
was, however, little correlation of portfolio concentration percentages
-3-
between the two investor types [23, p. 51]. Separate data for a
smaller group of stocks held during 1972 (83 stocks versus 593 for
the SEC data) showed somewhat higher correlation of concentration
percentages (.39 versus .21), There was also evidence that bank
trust departments had increased portfolio concentration from 1969
to 1972 to a much greater extent than had the regulated investment
companies [23, p. 53].
Rosenberg [22] also presents evidence of concentration of holdings,
especially among stocks with large market values. A "concentration in-
dex" was defined as:
_ ,
_
$ Holdings of a firm/ total $ Portfolio Holdings
Market Value of firm/market value of all firms *
This index should have a value of 1.0 for a firm which is held in
proportion to its market value weight. Rosenberg found that this con-
centration index increased with the logarithm of the firm's market
value. Both ownership and trading volume tended to be concentrated
in large market valued securities,
Dobbins and Greenwood [9] examined the UK equity markets from
1966-72, with regard to the stabilizing influence of institutional
shareholders. As they state:
"...in order to test the hypothesis that institutional
shareholder equity activity pushes prices away from ex-
tremes to some apparently preferable central position,
we have studied the purchasing and selling behavior for
each class of institution for the 20 quarters ended
December 1972, and calculated the product moment cor-
relation coefficients between the quarterly averages
of the Financial Times all-share index and the corre-
sponding quarterly sales, purchases, net acquisitions
and total turnover of the various classes of institu-
tional shareholder," [9, p. 263]
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Three basic questions were examined:
(1) Do institutions buy at the troughs and sell at peaks? The
hypothesis was "strongly rejected in the cases of insurance
companies, pension funds and combined institutions. Only
investment and unit trusts could be considered to have any
'stabilizing' influence at all." [9, p. 264]
(2) Do institutions contribute less to total equity turnover
at highs than at lows? Though the "test" they perform is
indirect and highly dependent upon a close relationship
between trading volume and prices, the authors conclude
that there is "no evidence to suggest that institutions
provide this kind of stability." [9, p. 265]
(3) Is the equity activity of institutions more stabilizing
than that of other investors? Correlations of institutional
and other investors' turnover with the all-share index
showed no significant differences, suggesting that "neither
group is more 'stabilizing.'" [9, p. 265]
Dobbins and Greenwood conclude:
"The available evidence suggests that institutional
shareholders do not provide meaningful equity stability
in accord with the theory of efficient resource alloca-
tion." [9, p. 266]
Reilly [19] relates three measures of stock price volatility
with three measures of institutional trading activity for 46 quarters
ending in the second quarter of 1975 and for 13 years of annual data
ending with 1974. While the three trading variables were highly cor-
related with each other in both quarterly and annual data sets, cor-
relations between the trading activity variables and the volatility
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measures were generally insignificant. For the quarterly data, only
the correlation between institutional purchases and sales as a percent
of total trading volume and price range/low price was significant at
the .05 level, with a value of .281. Correlations between trading and
volatility measures were generally smaller for the annual data, and
none were statistically significant. Reilly notes:
"One would certainly be hard put to infer from this
any support for the belief that a strong positive
relationship exists between institutional trading
and stock price volatility." [19, p. 7]
Reilly and Wachowicz [20] examine ten trading activity variables
and eight stock price volatility measures on a quarterly basis for
1964-1976. Unlike the previous study, measures of variability of
daily prices within each quarter are used, in addition to the three
measures from [19]. Results are generated for four institutional
groups (pension funds, open-end investment companies, life insurance
companies, and property and casualty insurance companies) as well as
overall.
The overall results showed fairly consistent negative correlations
(73 of 80) in the overall data, but only nine of the 80 were signifi-
cant at the .05 level. The fairly consistent negative correlations
persisted for all the subgroups except the property and liability in-
surance companies, where only 21 of the 30 correlations between the
trading and volatility measures were negative. There were no more
than 12 instances of statistical significance (and as few as zero)
for any subgroup.
These results would seem to indicate that any evidence for or
against institutional trading as a stabilizing influence is likely
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to be quite sensitive to variable definition. While the predominance
of negative correlations is somewhat encouraging for those who would
argue that institutions exercise a stabilizing influence, the disturbing
lack of consistent statistical significance weakens the argument.
Nonetheless, there appears to be n£ significant evidence that institu-
tional trading, in the aggregate , is destabilizing .
The question of whether institutional holdings (and changes in
holdings) are stabilizing or destabilizing, in the sense of reducing
or increasing total risk, for indlvldtial securities was investigated
in an earlier study by the author [8]. Examination of a random sample
of 100 NYSE-listed common stocks continuously listed for the 21-month
period from May, 1974 to January, 1976, inclusive, showed statistically
significant evidence of stabilizing behavior. Various measures of
total variability of returns (and changes in variability from month-
to-month) were chosen as dependent variables and related to five
alternative measures of institutional holdings (and changes in holdings),
The holding measures are also used in this study and will be defined
and discussed in a subsequent section.
While the regression results generally shoxred high levels of
statistical significance for a negative (i.e., stabilizing ) relation-
ship between institutional holding levels and levels of stock price
variability, the low level of R" values among the regression results
as well as the general lack of statistical significance in examining
the relationship between changes (rather than levels) of the variables,
could have resulted from a time series instability of the slope co-
efficients. This possibility is currently being investigated by
examining the relationship for various subperiods within the overall
21-month period. Subject to this reservation, the evidence showed
reduction in variability , on an individual stock basis , with increased
institutional holdings, though the influence was somewhat sensitive
to variable definition for the holding variable.
In the current study, we examine only the systematic element of
total risk and attempt to allow for monthly changes to examine the
potential effects of time series sensitivity of the coefficients as
well as potential stationarity problems with the beta coefficient.
Hypotheses
There are two areas in which institutional holding differences
could influence systematic risk of individual securities. The first
of these is in the level of systematic risk, typically measured by
the beta coefficient.
B, = cov(r,,rJ/o^ " (1)
J j m m
where :
cov(r
.
, r ) = covariance between the rates of return on
security j (r.) and the market portfolio (r )
2
a = variance of the return on the market portfolio
m
If a large number of institutional holders exerts a destabilizing
effect on individual security prices, as some "market folklore" would
2indicate, one would expect a positive relationship between the beta
coefficient and reasonably well-behaved measures of institutional
holdings. On the other hand, a large institutional interest in a
stock, to the extent that it is a result of a large number of institu-
tional owners, not just a few huge holdings, might be argued tc be
stabilizing under normal circumstances becuase of a greater likelihood
of finding an institution willing to buy when another wishes to sell.
Under these conditions, normal shifts in portfolio composition due to
factors other than major changes in prospects for the underlying
security could be absorbed with little price impact. Similarly, off-
setting trades could occur in the event of new information which is
not clearly good or bad; some institutions might ignore such informa-
tion, while others could reach different conclusions as to its impact.
To the extent that institutions agree on the impact of any new
information on a security, one would expect them to be trading on the
same side of the market, thus causing more rapid price movements.
This would be expected to occur partly because of little interest on
"the other side" of the market and partly because of the tendency of
3
Institutions to react more rapidly to new information.
The second area of influence would be in the proportion of total
risk which is systematic. If one accepts the empirical validity of
the market model:
r.^ = a. + 6,r ^ + e.^ (2)jt J j mt jt
where
^jt = ^Pjt-^^jt>/Pj.t-l
r
.
= (I. + d J/r ,
mt t mt t-1
p = price per share of security j at the end of period t
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p ^ = price per share of security j at the end of
^ ' period t-1, adjusted for changes in capitalization
between t-1 and t
d, = cash dividends per share received by holders of
^ security j during period t
d = equivalent per share dividends paid on market index
(I) shares during period t
I ,1
^
= levels of market index at end of periods t and
t-1, respectively
a. = regression constant for security j
t = error term (residual) for security j in period t
2
then the coefficient of determination (R ) from the market model
regression is one measure of the proportion of total risk which is
systematic for a given security. Because of the relative sophistication
of institutional research, the continual monitoring of market conditions
by investment professionals, and relatively rapid reaction to changes
in market and individual security prospects, one would expect stocks
with a higher level of institutional ownership to show a higher propor-
tion of systematic risk, regardless of the level of systematic risk
demonstrated.
Institutional Holding Variables
The measures of institutional shareholdings were as follows:
HOLDl^ = NINST
H0LD2 = NSHRS^
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H0LD3 = NSHRS /SALES
H0LD4 = NSHRS /NINST
t t t
HOLD 5 = NSHRS ^/ SHOUT
^
t t t
where:
NINST = number of institutions holding shares of the stock
in month t
NSHRS = number of shares of the stock held by institutions
in month t
SALES = total trading volume of the stock in month t
SHOUT = number of shares of the common stock outstanding
in month t
The first variable (HOLDl) measures stictly the number of institu-
tions holding shares of a given stock, without regard to the size of
those holdings. As such, it would appear to be a less desirable measure
than one which contains both factors. Similarly, H0LD2 measures total
shareholdings, but not the number of institutions involved. The larger
the number of institutions holding a given company's common stock, the
lower one would ejipect price volatility to be, since there would be
more potential institutional buyers (sellers) in the event of a block
sale (purchase). Thus, we expect HOLDl to have a negative relationship
with S> . . For similar reasons, HOLD 2 should have a negative relation-
ship, though a large number of shares would not necessarily imply a
large number of institutional buyers and sellers. Both HOLDl and H0LD2
2
should show positive relationships with the R from the market model,
since both are positive measures of institutional holdings.
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H0LD4 combines both aspects of holdings: size and number of
institutions in a measure of average number of shares held per insti-
tution . This would, a priori, appear to be a more desirable measure
than either separate factor, though it could be influenced considerably
by one or two very large holdings.
HOLDS measures shareholdings of institutions relative to total
trading volume of the stock. A relatively inactive stock would have
high values of this variable and one might expect that this would go
along with high volatility. That is, any attempts to change positions
in the stock would exacerbate price movements in a normally inactive
stock. Still, it is difficult to make any a priori arguments for the
sign of the slope coefficient in this case, because of the likely rela-
tionship between numerator and denominator of the variable. That is,
in a market increasingly dominated by institutions, a stock w^ith
larger trading volume is lilcely to be one with a large number of shares
held by institutions. The primary reason for including the variable
is that the numerator would not reflect increasing turnover among the
institutions to the extent the denominator would. When high turnover
occurs, the ratio would decline. To the extent that this increases
price variability, one would expect a negative relationship.
HOLDS measures the proportion of outstanding shares held by
institutions. If institutional trading is, in fact, a stabilizing
influence at the individual security level, this variable should be
negativelj' related to the level of systematic risk.
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Data
The monthly Standard and Poor's Stock Guide [9] was used to
collect information for the institutional holding variables for a
random selection of 100 NYSE-listed common stocks for a related studj-
[8]. Data were collected for the 21 months beginning in May, 1974,
and ending with January, 1976. Two subsets of this sample were used
in the current study. The first subset consisted of those stocks
with complete return data on the CRSP tape for 36 months prior to the
beginning of the test period (May, 1974). The second subset consisted
of those with complete data on CRSP for 60 months prior to May, 1974.
All 100 stocks had complete data for the 21-month test period.
This procedure gave 80 stocks for which 3-year "trailing betas"
could be computed for the entire 21-month test period and 71 stocks
for which 5-year "trailing betas" could be computed. These beta co-
2
efficients and the associated R values (not adjusted for degrees of
freedom) were generated from ordinary least squares estimation of
regressions of the form
ln(r.^) = a. + e.ln(r^^) -f e.^ (3)
for security j for each of the 21 months (t = 1, 2, ..., 21) of the
test period. In each regression, the number of observations was held
constant at 36 or 60, depending upon the data subset under considera-
tion. That is, for each security, j, there would be a vector of B
2
values and R, values:
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^jl' ^j2 ^j21
2 2 2
^jl' ^j2 ^j21
2
where the first values (£ . and R.-,) were generated from a regression
from t = -35 to t = 1 (for the 36-month trailing betas). There would
also be a similar set of values for the 60-month trailing betas, where
2
6.- and R.J correspond to regressions from t = -59 to t = 1. Values
2
of g.„ and R. „ for the two subsets would then be generated by re-
running the regressions from t = -34 to t = 2 (or t = -58 to t = 2),
etc. In the presentation of regression results, the variables based
on 36-month trailing betas will be denoted BETA36 and RSQ36 and
those based on 60-month betas will be denoted BETA60 and RSQ60 to
minimize notational confusion.
Table 1 shows mean values, month-by-month and overall, for the
B and R^ generated by this procedure. While the original 100-stock
sample did not show a mean 3 value significantly different from 1.000
for 21-month betas during this test period, the results here show
several mean beta values significantly different from 1.000, though
most instances of this occurred during the last half of 1974 (months
1-5 are May-September, 1974), when stock market conditions might well
have been responsible for atypical response patterns. Both BETA36
and BETA60 showed drastic declines in mean value from month 1 to month
8 before settling into a more stable pattern (though still a decline)
from month 9 to month 21.
Table 2 presents correlation coefficients, on a monthly basis, be-
tween BETA36 and EETA60 and between RSQ36 and RSQ60. These correlations
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stabillzed somewhat for the RSQ values at .90-. 92 for the last two-
thirds of the stud}' period. Over the same period, the BETA correla-
tions increased reasonably steadily from .90 to .97. Even though
the BETA36 figures would be expected to show less stationary behavior
across time than the BETA60 figures, the two were at least very
highly correlated over most of the test period.
Table 3 shows monthly and overall mean values for each of the
five alternative holding variables employed as potential explanatory
variables in the regression analysis. H0LD3 appeared to be the most
volatile, at least in terms of monthly fluctuations in its mean value
over the test period. This is not surprising, since the denominator
of HOLDS (monthly trading volume) is a considerably more volatile
variable than any of the other three basic variables (NINST, NSHRS,
and SHOUT) entering the various holding variable definitions. The
overall figures show that there were an average of just over 80 in-
stitutions holding an average of 2,184,500 shares of stock of the
so-stock sample. Institutions held shares representing about 75%
of monthly trading volume on average (HOLDS). Note that this does
not say that institutional trading during the month represented 75*
of trading volume. The average size of institutional holdings was
just under 28,200 shares (H0LD4) and institutional holdings represented
just under 10% of total shares outstanding (HOLDS) for the sample
stocks.
Table 4 shows overall correlations between the HOLD variables,
as well as minimum and maximum monthly correlation coefficients. As
expected from the variable definitons, the only negative correlation
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was between HOLDl and H0LD4. H01D4 is no more than H0LD2/H0LD1 and
thus would be expected to show negative correlation. The only sur-
prising (perhaps) element of the correlations in Table 4A is the
relatively low magnitudes of all correlations involving the "'nonaal-
ized" variables (H0LD3, H0LD4, and H01D5) with such a high correlation
(.921) for H0LD1-H0LD2. One would expect these ratio-form variables
to show lower magnitudes, but the extreme reductions in two-thirds of
the remaining correlations were somewhat unexpected.
Parts B and C of Table 4 show maximum and minimum correlations,
respectivelj', on a monthly basis, as well as the month in which the
value occurred. There was a slight tendency for the minimum values
to occur relatively early in the test period and the maximum values
to occur relatively later, though there were exceptions.
Regression Tests
Simple linear regression models were estimated for general
relationships of the forms:
BETA36 = a. + b HOLD (4)
BETA60 = a + b_HOLD (5)
RSQ36 = a + b HOLD (6)
RSQ60 = a, + b, HOLD (7)
4 4
Each model included the five alternative forms of HOLD discussed
earlier. Standard OLS procedures were used to estimate the parameters
(a., b.) of the various models.
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Each model (20 separate models consisting of all combinations
of the four dependent and five independent variables) was estimated
for each of the 21 months of the test period. In addition, an "over-
g
all" regression was run for each of the 20 models.
Regression Results
The overall regression results are presented in Table 5. While
some aspects of these overall results might be classified as interesting,
it is difficult to classify then as meaningful, given what they repre-
sent. That is, each BETA60 regression would have 21 monthly observa-
tions for each of 71 companies, for a total of 1491 observations.
However, the observations are a combination of cross-sectional and
time series variability. On top of this, the method by which the
trailing betas were computed, in an attempt to incorporate changes in
the betas over time, gives a considerable overlap in the observations
entering the beta calculations. These procedures introduce so many
biases into the statistics in Table 5 as to render them (at best)
highly questionable. The primary reason for presenting them is to
show the form of the results before presenting a somewhat more complex
table which attempts to summarize on one page the salient features of
420 separate monthly regressions which do not suffer from these short-
comings .
The indicated summary data is in Table 6, This table indicates
2
only the maximum value (magnitude, ignoring sign) of the adjusted R
and the slope coefficient for the various model forms, as well as the
month (1 through 21) during which it occurred. It also shows the number
of significant (a = .05) slope coefficents of the 21 monthly estimates.
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The feature that immediately stands out from the BETA36 and BETA60
models Is the consistent significance of the forim of the model which
includes H0LD4. In all instances, this forum gave a statistically
significant slope coefficient, while the best any other forum of the
HOLD variable did was 4 cases of significance out of 21 regressions.
Stocks with large average holdings (HOLDA) had significantly higher
beta values, with the beta coefficient increasing on the order of .01
9for every additional 1,000 shares held, on average, by institutions.
The results for the RSQ36 and RSQ60 models were not quite so
clear-cut as for the BETA models. Kere, KOIDA had the lowest propor-
tion of significant slope coefficients. Thus, while it was excellent
In "explaining" the level of systematic risk, it was nearly worthless
In explaining the proportion of systematic risk for the sample stocks.
HOLDl was slightly better than E0LD3 in this respect, but R0LD2 and
E0LD5 were close, at least in the 60-month regression forms. A co-
efficient on the order of .0003 for HOIDl would indicate that the RSQ
value increased by one percentage point (.01) for every (roughly) 35
institutions which held the firm's stock. Given the range of values
of NINST for the sample, this indicates a range of not much more than
+ .05 in the RSQ values as a result of differences in holdings, giving
some doubt as to the practical significance of the statistical signif-
icance noted.
Summary
The effect of institutional shareholdings on systematic risk of
individual common stocks was investigated by examining a random sample
of ITifSE-listed stocks for the period from May, 197A to January, 1976.
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The level of systematic risk was measured by 3-year or 5-year "moving
betas" for the sample stocks, and the proportion of systematic risk
2
was measured by the R'^ from the market model regressions used to
estimate these moving betas. Using a series of regression models
with various definitions of institutional holdings, there was evidence
that increased holdings significantly increase both the level and
proportion of systematic risk. Some alternative holding variables,
however, showed a negative (but not consistently significant) relation-
ship between beta and holdings.
-19-
FOOTNOTES
*Associate Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. Data collection efforts were supported by a grant from the
Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR) of the College of
Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois, Most
of the empirical results were generated by Cheng-shing Cheng and the
massive task of summarizing the regression results was eased considerably
by the assistance of my father, William Carey, at various times. I am
grateful for both sources of assistance, as well as the support provided
by the BEBR.
The majority of this section, with minor editorial changes,
is taken from Carey [8],
2
For example, see Klemkoshy and Scott [16], page 12.
3More rapidly, that is, than individual investors who generally
would not be in such constant contact with market developments or the
investment professionals.
The computer program used to generate these "moving betas" from
data on the CRSP tape was written by R. H. Gilmer, a Ph.D. candidate
at the University of Illinois.
See Carey [8], Table 1, page 14.
For example, see Zumwalt and Eubank [28].
NSHRS was recorded in thousands of shares.
g
This procedure was included more for the sake of curiosity.
Comments in the following section are directed towards its lack of
usefulness for our purposes.
9
Recall that the values in Table 6 are maximtm magnitudes. Values
varied somewhat on a monthly basis, though HOLDY's coefficient varied
less than the others.
M/E/223
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TABLE 1
Mean Values cf b and R2 from Market Line Regressions
Month
1 1.285*
2 1.268*
3 1.195*
4 1.172*
5 1.110*
6 1.027
7 1.025
8 1.021
9 1.093
10 1.088
11 1.099*
12 1.089
13 1.093
14 1.095*
15 1.082
16 1.089
17 1.086
18 1.076
19 1.075
20 1.078
21 1.104*
36-month regressions
.3071
.2993
.2841
.2890
.2911
.3164
.3147
.2926
.3409
.3455
.3469
.3435
.3491
.3515
.35 38
.3524
.3530
.3565
.35 37
.3548
.3844
60-month regressions
1 ^
1.232* .3475
1.232* .3408
1.197* .3268
1.188* .3331
1.151* .3341
1.091* .3366
1.086 .3327
1.085* .3310
1.141* .3581
1.142* .3586
1.146* .3585
1.134* .3394
1.134* .3346
1.131* .3325
1.114* .3285
1.110* .3264
1.102* .3246
1.092* .3257
1.091* .3232
1.089 .3186
1.098* .3380
1.133* .3357
om 1.000 at the .05 leve
Overall 1.107* .3324
*Mean 6 value significantly different fr
TABLE 2
Correlations Between 36-month and 60-month Statistics
Month Betas R-Squared Values
1 .8906 .7836
2 .8625 .8070
3 .8452 .79A5
A .8267 .7909
5 .8578 .8574
6 .8647 .8888
7 .8707 .8949
8 .8572 .8773
9 .9131 .9172
10 .9012 .9128
11 .9098 .9088
12 .9270 .9280
13 .9381 .9123
14 .9513 .9186
15 .9479 .9022
16 .9528 .9047
17 .9566 .9004
18 .9575 .9006
19 .9550 .9049
20 .9572 .8956
21 .9722 .9145
TABLE 3
Mean Values of Holding Variables—Monthly and Overall
Month
Overall
HOLDl
80.08
HOLD 2 H0LD3
2184.5 0.748
H0LD4
28.17
HOLDS
1 77.68 2165.2 0.944 27.88 .0989
2 77.75 2170.2 0.981 27.89 .0991
3 77.86 2154.1 0.998 27.30 .0975
4 79.80 2204.3 0.992 28.64 .0997
5 80.15 2209.9 0.927 28.64 .0998
6 80.43 2191.8 0.981 29.12 .0993
7 80.21 2190.4 0.690 29.12 .0990
8 80.21 2188.2 0.863 29.10 .0988
9 79.51 2193.6 0.671 29.12 .0984
10 80.81 2187.5 0.552 28.89 .0983
11 80.84 2185.2 0.619 29.04 .0978
12 81.38 2205.3 0.590 28.12 .0978
13 81.36 2209.9 0.590 28.14 .0971
14 81.36 2212.2 0.570 28.13 .0973
15 81.46 2196.4 0.559 27.75 .0964
16 80.40 2177.1 0.544 27.61 .0942
17 80.25 2170.2 0.846 27.64 .0936
18 80.28 2157.2 0.823 27.00 .0923
19 80.38 2158.6 0.663 27.07 .0921
20 80.48 2176.6 0.713 27.29 .0918
21 79.03 2169.9 0.683 28.05 .0917
.0967
TABLE A
Correlations Between Holding Variables
A. Overall
H0LD2 HOLDS HOLDA HOLDS
HOLDl
E0LD2
HOLDS
HOLDA
.921 .121
.175
B. Maximun*
-.025
.ISA
.258
Monthly Values
.229
.311
.571
.389
H0LD2 HOLDS HOLDA H0LD5
HOLDl
HOLD 2
HOLDS
HOLDA
.9S5(19) .3S5(9)
.A15(9)
C. Minimum*
.001(2)
.178(3)
.A22(18)
Monthly Values
.2A8(18)
.3A3(20)
.727(18)
.AS2(17)
H0LD2 HOLDS HOLDA HOLDS
HOLDl
H0LD2
HOLDS
HOLDA
.909(5) .0S1(7)
.083(A)
-.0A9(6)
.109(11)
.1A8(12)
.213(18)
.278(5)
.A16(7)
.337(6)
*Maximum and Minimum refer to algebraic values, not magnitudes. Hov?-
ever, the only correlation with any negative values was between HOLDl
and EOLDA, where 19 of 21 monthly values were negative, including the
largest magnitudes. The numbers enclosed in parentheses represent the
month of occurrence of the values shown.
TABLE 5
Overall Regression Results
Variable Adjusted
Constant SlopeDependent Independent F
BETA60 HOLDl .0510 1.191 * -.678 X 10"^*
10'^*
^°l2
10 *
81.00*
H0LD2 .0343 1.182 * -.213 X 53.96*
HOLDS .0018 1.154 * -.277 X 3.65
H0LD4 .1177 0.958 * .615 X 199.72*
H0LD5 .0001 1.161 * .167 1.15
BETA3 6 HOLDl .0277 1.156 * -.608 X
10 *
l°l2
10 ^*
48.17*
H0LD2 .0213 1.152 * -.205 X 37.59*
HOLDS 1.096 * .152 X 0.89
E0LD4 .0770 0.941 * .590 X 141.09*
HOLDS .0032 1.065 * 432 ** 6.30*
RSQ60 HOLDl .0756 .3129* .265 X 10"^*
10"^^*
10":^*
10"-^*
122.77*
H0LD2 .0536 .3159* .853 X 85.39*
HOLDS .0572 .3030* .433 X 91.41*
HOLDA .0239 .3100* .900 X 37.46*
H0LD5 .0570 .2897* .463 * 91.03*
RSQ36 HOLDl .0516 .3101* .278 X 10"^*
10~^*
10 ~;*
io~-^*
92.40*
H0LD2 .0316 .3142* .831 X 55.74*
HOLDS .0358 .3010* .420 X 63.29*
H0LD4 .0133 .3089* .833 X 23.58*
HOLDS .0359 .2887* .451 * 63.53*
*Significant at the .01 level.
**Significant at the .05 level.
2
BETA60 and RSQ60 are the g and R'^ from a market line regression with
60 monthly observations; BETA36 and RSQ36 are the corresponding sta-
tistics for 36-month regressions.
TABLE 6
Selected Summary Statistics from the 21 Monthly
Cross-Sectional Regressions
Maximum Maximum No. ,
Signif.*-^^Variable justed
(month)
Slope
Coef. (month)Dependent Independent (a = .05)
BETA60''-'-^ HOLDl .150 (1) -.151 X 10"^ (1)
-.437 X 10"^ (1)
4
H0LD2 .093 (1) 3
H0LD3 .030 (12) -.142 (12)
.111 X 10"-^ (2)H0LD4 .155 (2) 21
H0LD5 (all) .494 (17)
BETA36^-^^ HOLDl .119 (2) -.198 X 10~l (2)
-.621 X 10"^ (2)
4
H0LD2 .089 (2) 3
H0LD3 .041 (12) -.171 (12) 1
H0LD4 .118 (17) .011 (1) 21
HOLDS .046 (1) 1.140 (8)
Rsqeo^-"-^ HOLDl .135 (18) .374 X 10"^(21)
.127 X 10"^ (18)
16
H0LD2 .098 (18) 12
H0LD3 .169 (16) .109 (16)
.237 X 10""^ (2)
13
H0LD4 .100 (2) 4
HOLDS .086 (17) .585 (17) 12
RSQ36^-'-^ HOLDl .108 (6) .435 X 10"^ (6)
.143 X 10~^ (6)
16
_ H0LD2 .080 (6) 9
H0LD3 .124 (16) .108 (16)
.263 X 10~^ (1)
14
H0LD4 .013 (6) 3
HOLDS .046 (1) .813 (6) 5
Notes: (1) BETA60 and RSQ60 are the beta coefficient and R^ value
for market line regressions with 60 monthly observations;
BETA36 and RSQ36 are the corresponding statistics for 36-
month regressions.
(2) maximum magnitude , not maximum algebraic value.
(3) number of months (of 21 possible) with significant slope
coefficients at the .05 level.
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